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The Uses and Abuses of Constitutional Pluralism: Undermining the Rule of Law in the 
Name of Constitutional Identity in Hungary and Poland 
 
R Daniel KELEMEN 
Rutgers University  




This article explains why autocrats love constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity. 
Though these concepts were developed by scholars and jurists with the best of intentions 
in mind, we explain why they are also attractive to and inherently prone to abuse by 
autocrats. We then describe how the regimes in Hungary and Poland have made use of 
these concepts in their drive to consolidate autocracy. We conclude that given the dangers 
inherent in constitutional pluralism and its susceptibility to abuse, it should be replaced 
with a more traditional understanding of the primacy of EU law. 
 





In EU law—as so often in life—the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The scholars 
who developed the theory of constitutional pluralism had the best of intentions in mind, 
but their creation is having destructive consequences that threaten the entire EU legal order. 
Constitutional pluralism is a theory developed by scholars who sought to resolve the 
conflict between the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) and some national 
constitutional courts, above all Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 
concerning whether the CJEU or national constitutional courts had the ultimate authority 
 
to rule in cases concerning the boundaries of the EU’s legal competence. Though the CJEU 
and national constitutional courts accepted that each other were supreme on legal questions 
within their respective domains, this left open the question of ‘boundary disputes’ between 
legal orders: which court had the competence to rule on the boundaries between EU’s legal 
competences and a national system’s competences?  
This so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz debate centred around which court could rule 
on whether EU law had overstepped the bounds of its authority and trod on some reserved 
area of national competence, including a sacrosanct area of national competence that 
constituted an inviolable aspect of a state’s so-called ‘constitutional identity’.1 Scholars 
developed the theory of constitutional pluralism as a fudge to avoid the outbreak of a guerre 
des juges over who would have the final say in such boundary disputes between EU law 
and national constitutional law. The theory suggested that questions of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz should be left unresolved in favour of a ‘heterarchical’ (ie non-hierarchical) 
system in which neither the CJEU nor national constitutional or supreme courts could claim 
definitive primacy on questions of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but instead would engage in 
ongoing dialogue, self-restraint, and mutual accommodation.2 
                                                 
1 G Beck, ‘The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the 
Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 471. As the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
debate makes clear, the concepts of constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism are closely related. 
The doctrine of constitutional pluralism accepts the legitimacy of national constitutional courts’ 
constitutional identity claims, but suggests that conflicts between the European Court of Justice and national 
constitutional courts should be resolved through dialogue and mutual accommodation rather than through 
uncompromising assertions of primacy. 
2 See for instance, N MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law 
Journal 259; N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317; M Poiares 
Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N Walker (ed.), Sovereignty 
in Transition (Hart, 2003), p 502; M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’, in JL Dunoff 
and JP Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp 258–324; M Avbelj and J Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism 
in the European Union and Beyond (Hart, 2012); A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute 
Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1 
M Goldmann, ‘Constitutional Pluralism as Mutually Assured Discretion’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of 
 
As we discuss below, the theory of constitutional pluralism had inherent flaws, but 
it could function as a serviceable fudge in the sense that it avoided stipulating what should 
happen where a direct and insoluble conflict emerged between EU and state courts; 
preferring, instead, to emphasise sincere cooperation, good faith dialogue, and mutual 
accommodation.3 However, with the emergence and ongoing consolidation of competitive 
authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Poland, the days when one could assume all national 
judiciaries would engage in sincere cooperation and mutual accommodation have ended, 
and the dangers that were always inherent in the concept of constitutional pluralism and 
the connected concept of constitutional identity, have become manifest for all to see.4 
Indeed, as this article will show, in an effort to justify dismantling all checks on their power 
and shielding themselves against potential EU interventions, Hungary and Poland’s 
governments have turned—quite predictably we argue—to the twin concepts of 
constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism. Thus, for instance, when Hungary 
blatantly violates the EU asylum acquis and refuses to recognise the primacy of EU law in 
this domain, it claims that control over migration is part of its constitutional identity. 
Likewise, when Poland attacks the independence of the judiciary, it claims that such 
matters fall within the exclusive bounds of its authority and cites scholars of constitutional 
pluralism and the EU’s ‘national identity clause’5 to justify its stance. 
                                                 
European and Comparative Law 119; N Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’ (2016) 22 European 
Law Journal 333. 
3 See R D Kelemen, ‘On the Unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 136. For critical responses to Kelemen’s analysis, see for instance N 
Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’, op cit; A Bobic, ‘Constitutional Pluralism is Not Dead’ (2017) 
18 German Law Journal 1395. 
4 See note 3 above and see also R D Kelemen, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism’ in G Davies and M 
Avbelj (eds) Research Handbook on Pluralism and EU law (Edward Elgar, 2018), pp 392–403. 
5 Article 4(2) TEU states, ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well 
as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
 
Of course, most, if not all, scholars of constitutional pluralism would be mortified 
to see their ideas abused in this way. Defenders of this concept as setting limits on the 
CJEU’s assertions of primacy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz could argue that the fact that 
their ideas are distorted and abused by legal miscreants need not discredit the ideas 
themselves.6 While it is true that any ideas, even the most noble or sound ones, can be 
manipulated and abused, some ideas are inherently dangerous, and constitutional pluralism 
is certainly one of them. To borrow reasoning from the field of tort law, constitutional 
pluralism is an abnormally dangerous product and its manufacturers should be held to a 
standard of strict liability for the damage it has caused. It is time for scholars of 
constitutional pluralism to issue a recall on the dangerous product they released into the 
marketplace of ideas: they should now recognize the dangers inherent in their concept and 
its susceptibility to abuse, and they should either refashion it to reduce its dangers and make 
it ‘autocrat proof’ or, better yet, simply call for their flawed design to be replaced with a 
more traditional understanding of the primacy of EU law—namely that developed by the 
CJEU in a long line of jurisprudence since Costa.7 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. We begin in Part II by analysing 
the inherent flaws in the theory of constitutional pluralism and explaining why it holds such 
appeal for autocrats. Part III details the abuse of the concepts of constitutional pluralism 
and constitutional identity by the governments—and their kangaroo courts—in Hungary 
and Poland. Part IV concludes. 
                                                 
regional and local self-government’. For the genesis of this provision, see L Besselink, ‘National and 
Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 36. 
6 For an example of such a defence of constitutional pluralism against these developments, see the 
discussion in Lawrence’s contribution to the current volume. 
7 Costa v ENEL, C 6/64, EU:C:1964:34, p 594. 
 
 
II. WHAT IS WRONG WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND WHY 
AUTOCRATS LOVE IT 
 
It will be argued below that constitutional pluralism is a fundamentally flawed and 
unsustainable concept, inherently prone—alongside the closely related notion of 
‘constitutional identity’—to abuse by autocrats and other enemies of the rule of law. 
 
A. Constitutional pluralism as a fundamentally flawed and unsustainable concept 
 
Constitutional pluralism is built on an unsustainable foundation composed of a mix of 
wishful thinking and evasion of tough choices.8 Insofar as a pluralist approach would allow 
the apex courts of Member States to disapply EU rules they deem incompatible with their 
constitutions or particularly inviolable aspects of their ‘constitutional identity’, this would 
lead to an outcome in which commonly agreed EU rules end up applying in some countries 
but not in others. The CJEU explained the consequences of this approach in stark terms in 
its early landmark ruling on the primacy of EU law in Costa v ENEL, when it explained 
that if Community law were allowed to be overridden by domestic law, this would give 
rise to discrimination on the basis of nationality and would lead to Community law being 
‘deprived of its character as Community law’, and lead to ‘the legal basis of the Community 
itself being called into question’.9 As Federico Fabbrini has pointed out, this scenario 
                                                 
8 Similarly, see J Baquero Cruz, ‘Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union’ (2016) 
22(3) European Law Journal 356, p 369, arguing that, ‘The discourse of constitutional pluralism is built on 
the basis of this unrealistic vision’. 
9 Costa v ENEL, note 7 above, p 594.  
 
would also violate the EU law principle of equality of the Member States, in that it would 
allow some Member States to evade common EU obligations that bound others.10 Finally, 
this situation would also violate fundamental rule of law principles, such as the 
requirements of legal certainty, and that law be ‘general’ and ‘applied to everyone 
according to its terms’.11 Ultimately, constitutional pluralism is unsustainable because it 
invites legal chaos in which national constitutional courts could, in Fabbrini’s words, ‘pick 
and choose’12 which EU laws their states need to follow and which they do not, an outcome 
that would unravel the EU legal order.13 
Constitutional pluralists, insofar as they recognised these risks, hoped such chaos could 
be avoided through a mixture of ongoing dialogue, sincere cooperation and mutual 
accommodation between national courts and the CJEU.14 And indeed, until recently, head 
to head conflict and outright defiance of the CJEU by national courts was mostly avoided. 
But this tenuous situation was sustainable only so long as the German BVerfG and the 
handful of other national constitutional courts that raised objections to the CJEU’s 
                                                 
10 See F Fabbrini, ‘After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the 
Member States’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1015. 
11 For a presentation of the European Commission (and CJEU’s) approach to the concept of rule of law, see 
COM(2014) 158 final, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. For a more general discussion 
of the tensions between rule of law and legal pluralism, see B Tamanaha, ‘The Rule of Law and Legal 
Pluralism in Development’ (2011) 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1. For an early critique of 
constitutional pluralism in the EU from the perspective of legal philosophy, see G Letsas, ‘Harmonic Law: 
The Case Against Pluralism’ in J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European 
Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
12 Fabbrini, note 10 above, p 1016. 
13 Kelemen, note 4 above. See also Baquero Cruz, note 8 above, p 368, where he explains that 
constitutional pluralism, ‘undermines the main objective of integration and the basic social function of 
law’. For further exploration of the logical contradictions inherent in constitutional pluralism, see Kelemen, 
note 3 above, p 146, who points out that, ‘Governments seeking to avoid obligations of EU law could evade 
them by enacting constitutional norms that contradict these obligations’. Notably, even some prominent 
scholars who are critical of the CJEU’s approach to the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz agree that the 
doctrine of constitutional pluralism is based on an obfuscation of the fact that in cases of normative 
conflict, ultimately some judicial authority must have the final say. See eg G Davies, Constitutional 
Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism (2010) Eric Stein Working Paper 1/2010; and M 
Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) 3(1) Global Constitutionalism 9. 
14 See Maduro, note 2 above, p 501.  
 
interpretation of primacy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz exercised self-restraint and operated 
in a spirit of sincere cooperation. But it was naïve to think that modus vivendi could last, 
and indeed it has been collapsing before our eyes.15 
 
B. Constitutional pluralism as a concept inherently prone to abuse by autocrats 
 
The EU professes to be a union of democracies. Recognising that national democracies 
vary in many ways, EU leaders have not sought to impose anything approaching a uniform 
model of democracy. Yet, Member States did commit themselves to uphold a set of 
fundamental democratic values, embodied in Article 2 Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), 
which provides that ‘[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities’. Since 2010 in Hungary and since 2015 in 
Poland, however, governments have come to power that reject many of these core values 
and seek instead to entrench national level autocracies within the EU.16 
Clearly, there is a profound tension between the EU’s purported commitment to the 
defence of a core set of democratic values and the desire of certain member governments 
to defy those values. How then can an aspiring autocrat shield himself from federal 
                                                 
15 On the risks posed to the EU legal order by the trend of more national constitutional courts challenging the 
supremacy of EU law, see D Sarmiento, ‘The OMT Case and the Demise of the Pluralist Movement’ (21 
September 2015) Despite Our Differences Blog, at 
https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/the-omt-case-and-the-demise-of-the-pluralist-
movement; R Uitz, ‘National Constitutional Identity in the European Constitutional Project: A Recipe for 
Exposing Cover Ups and Masquerades’ (11 November 2016) Verfassungsblog. 
16 While the descent towards authoritarianism is most advanced in these two member states, there are early 
signs that the autocratic blueprint pioneered by Orbán is now being deployed by leaders in Romania and 
Bulgaria. See eg Council of Europe Venice Commission, Opinion – Romania, No. 924/2018, 13 July 2018 
and Opinion – Bulgaria, No. 855/2016, 9 October 2017. 
 
intervention and succeed in maintaining an authoritarian enclave within a democratic 
federal union? In part, the survival of such regimes is a matter of politics.17 As one of the 
present authors has argued elsewhere, the same sort of partisan political factors that explain 
the survival of subnational authoritarian enclaves in many federations also help explain the 
EU’s tolerance of the rise of autocratic Member State governments.18 But even if local 
autocracies can gain some political protection from action by federal lawmakers, they may 
still run into problems with federal courts—and this is where doctrines like constitutional 
pluralism and constitutional identity may prove important. 
Local autocrats operating within unions that guarantee the protection of 
fundamental rights and core democratic principles are naturally attracted to legal doctrines 
like constitutional pluralism that would provide them with a justification to ignore the 
union’s common norms. Thus, it is no coincidence that racist autocrats and segregationists 
in the American South have a long history of attempting to invoke their own version of a 
constitutional pluralism doctrine, one that they labelled nullification, ie, the theory that US 
states have the right to nullify federal laws they deem unconstitutional.19 Though it can be 
traced back to the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of the late eighteenth century, 
nullification was most famously championed by John Calhoun in the early 1830s. Versions 
of it have been resurrected in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,20 for instance by 
                                                 
17 The persistence of authoritarian regimes at the state level within broadly democratic federal unions is 
common around the world, from Latin America, to Asia, to the post-Civil War United States. Partisan politics 
often plays a key role in the survival of these autocratic regimes, with national level parties protecting local 
autocrats if they contribute votes to their national coalition. See E Gibson, Boundary Control (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012).  
18  R Daniel Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s 
Democratic Union’ (2017) 52(2) Government and Opposition 211. 
19 See R Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis (Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
20 See S Levinson, ‘The Twenty-first Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American 
Political Rhetoric’ (2014) 67 Arkansas Law Review 17. 
 
segregationists who sought to block school desegregation after Brown v Board of 
Education, or by (then) Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore who declared 
that Alabama did not need to recognize same-sex marriages legalized by the US Supreme 
Court’s Obergefell v Hodges decision. 21  Such doctrines are particularly appealing to 
leaders of local authoritarian enclaves if—as has been the case with constitutional 
pluralism in the EU context—they come with a distinguished legal pedigree that lends 
claims based on them a patina of legitimacy. The attractiveness of such doctrines to 
autocrats is evidenced in the contemporary EU. As we will see in Part III below, theories 
of constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity championed in good faith by 
distinguished legal scholars like Neil MacCormick and respected courts like the BVerfG 
are now being cited by autocratic regimes to justify defiance of fundamental EU values 
and of the rule of law itself. 
Sadly, all of this was predictable—and indeed some have been predicting it.22 The 
issue is not simply that the Polish or Hungarian governments are using the arguments in 
bad faith (though they certainly are doing that). Rather, these autocratic governments are 
simply carrying arguments about constitutional identity to their logical conclusions.23 If 
the esteemed courts of committed democracies such as the BVerfG can use constitutional 
identity claims to justify defiance of EU law, then so can the captured constitutional courts 
in Hungary and Poland. In other words, the aspects of the concepts of constitutional 
                                                 
21 Moore was removed from his position as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court as a result of his 
defiance of federal law. See J Adler, ‘Roy Moore is Constitutionally Illiterate’ (15 November 2017) The 
Weekly Standard, at https://www.weeklystandard.com/jonathan-h-adler/roy-moore-is-constitutionally-
illiterate. 
22 Kelemen, note 4 above; Sarmiento, note 15 above, Uitz, note 15 above.   
23 It may be worth noting that they do so in a broader context where authoritarian populists have successfully 
capitalised on the amplification (if not fabrication in some instances) of identity-based narratives/fears and 
nationalist sentiments. See recently, Political Capital Institute, Beyond Populism. Tribalism in Poland and 
Hungary (2018), at http://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=2277. 
 
pluralism and constitutional identity that have made them such useful tools for EU-based 
autocrats are not reparable bugs, but core features. And this is why no one should be 
surprised to see ‘kangaroo courts’ or other bodies under the sway of autocrats use the same 
ideas sincerely advanced by respected legal scholars and learned judges in Karlsruhe to 
advance their political masters’ authoritarian agendas and brazenly defy EU law when 
instructed to do so. 
 
III. THE ABUSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM/IDENTITY BY 
AUTOCRATS IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 
 
As William Dobson puts it in The Dictator’s Learning Curve, ‘today’s dictators and 
authoritarians are far more sophisticated, savvy, and nimble than they once were’.24 They 
understand, to quote Professor Gábor Halmai, that ‘in a globalized world the more brutal 
forms of intimidation are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion’. 25 Therefore, 
they work in a more ‘ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and 
authoritarianism’26 where they look ‘ almost democratic’27 such as the leader of Hungary, 
a Member State of the EU.28  
A similar diagnosis may already be offered regarding another EU Member State, 
Poland, where the ruling party has undertaken a systemic dismantlement of the country’s 
checks and balances in obvious breach of the national constitution and its international 
                                                 
24 The Dictator’s Learning Curve. Inside the Global Battle for Democracy (Harvill Secker London, 2012), p 
4.   
25  G Halmai, ‘Legally Sophisticated Authoritarians: The Hungarian Lex CEU’ (31 March 2017) 





obligations. 29  After years of dithering, EU institutions have finally reacted to the 
consolidation of autocratic regimes in these two Member States: the EU Commission 
activated for the first time the Article 7 procedure against Poland in December 2017,30 and 
the European Parliament followed suit in September 2018 when it activated the same 
procedure against Hungary.31  
To pre-empt or counteract external criticism as well as justify non-compliance with 
their European obligations, autocrats in both Hungary and Poland have relied on a number 
of similar strategies and rhetorical devices,32 including, as this Part will show, the two 
interrelated concepts most favoured by aspiring autocrats within the EU: constitutional 
pluralism and constitutional identity. 
Advocate General Maduro proved remarkably prescient in a 2008 Opinion when 
he warned of the potential abusive use of the notion of constitutional identity:  
 
[R]espect owed to the constitutional identity of the Member States cannot be 
understood as an absolute obligation to defer to all national constitutional rules. 
Were that the case, national constitutions could become instruments allowing 
                                                 
29 See L Pech and K Lane Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3.   
30 D Kochenov, L Pech, and K Lane Scheppele, ‘The European Commission’s Activation of Article 7: Better 
Late than Never?’ (23 December 2017) EU Law Analysis, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/12/the-
european-commissions-activation-of.html; T Koncewicz, The Polish Counter-revolution Two and a Half 
Years Later: Where Are We Today? (7 July 2018) VerfBlog, at https://verfassungsblog.de/the-polish-counter-
revolution-two-and-a-half-years-later-where-are-we-today. 
31 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by 
Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 2017/2131(INL). For background and a critical 
analysis, see S Carrera and P Bárd, ‘The European Parliament Vote on Article 7 TEU against the Hungarian 
government’ (14 September 2018) CEPS Commentary.  
32 For an overview of some of the main arguments used by autocrats to justify their actions and hide their 
intentions, see D Kochenov and P Bárd, Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU. The Pitfalls 
of Overemphasising Enforcement (RECONNECT, July 2018) Working Paper No. 1. 
 
Member States to avoid Community law in given fields. Furthermore, it could lead 
to discrimination between Member States based on the contents of their respective 
national constitutions. Just as Community law takes the national constitutional 
identity of the Member States into consideration, national constitutional law must 
be adapted to the requirements of the Community legal order.33 
 
The Advocate General’s worry has become today’s reality. Hungary and Poland’s 
autocratic authorities have found the interrelated concepts of constitutional pluralism and 
constitutional identity particularly helpful as they give a veneer of conceptual respectability 
to their autocratic ‘reforms’ which also makes it more difficult for international bodies such 
as the EU to challenge what amounts in fact to a systemic hollowing out or dismantlement 
of these countries’ democratic and rule of law norms and institutions.  
 
A. Constitutional identity as a justification for non-compliance with EU immigration 
and asylum law 
 
Since a European migration crisis emerged as a salient issue in 2015, Viktor Orbán’s 
government has sought to bolster its popularity by stoking fears about migrants and by 
styling himself as the defender of Hungary against the EU’s migration policies. Where his 
hostile migration policies have plainly violated EU legal requirements, Orbán has tried to 
justify them by invoking the notion of ‘constitutional identity’. In essence, his government 
has claimed that complying with EU migration and refugee policies would in some cases 
                                                 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and 
Ypourgos Epikrateias, C-213/07 EU:C:2008:544, para 33.  
 
violate Hungary’s constitutional identity, and that his government is therefore justified in 
ignoring them.34 
Before briefly exploring the content of the 2018 ‘constitutional identity’ provisions 
of Hungary’s Fundamental Law, it is important to stress that already in 2016 Hungary’s 
Constitutional Court (which by then had been captured by the ruling party) issued a ruling 
signalling it would support Orbán’s ‘constitutional identity’ justification for defying EU 
migration law. As the Hungarian Court put it, 
 
If human dignity, another fundamental right, the sovereignty of Hungary (including 
the extent of the transferred competences) or its self-identity based on its historical 
constitution can be presumed to be violated due to the exercise of competences 
based on Article (E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court may, in 
the course of exercising its competences, examine the existence of an alleged 
violation on the basis of a relevant petition.35 
 
As noted by Professors Kochenov and Bárd, the Court’s understanding of constitutional 
identity is ‘so vague that it can be considered as an attempt at granting a carte blanche type 
of derogation to the executive and the legislative from Hungary’s obligations under EU 
law’.36 More broadly speaking, and as compellingly argued by Professor Halmai, the 
Court’s ruling is ‘nothing but national constitutional parochialism’ which hides ‘an attempt 
                                                 
34 B Novak, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Identity Is Whatever Viktor Orbán Says It Is’ (28 March 2018) 
Budapest Beacon, at https://budapestbeacon.com/hungarys-constitutional-identity-is-whatever-viktor-orban-
says-it-its.  
35 Case 22/2016 quoted and translated by G Halmai, ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2018) 43(1) Review of 
Central and East European Law 23, pp 34–35.  
36 Kochenov and Bárd, note 32 above, p 12.  
 
to abandon the common European constitutional whole’ under the guise of the notion of 
constitutional identity, 37  which, as the Hungarian justices are unsurprisingly keen to 
emphasize, had been relied upon by a number of foreign courts and in particular, the 
BVerfG. However, unlike the BVerfG, the Hungarian Constitutional Court did not 
rubberstamp ‘the government’s constitutional identity defense’ 38  to justify a stricter 
defence of human rights (as most defenders of the BVerfG’s case law on constitutional 
identity had in mind), but the nativist, xenophobic migration policy of the Orbán regime.  
While the Constitutional Court’s ruling proved already helpful to defy the EU, the 
Orbán government preferred to have its constitutional identity justification for defying EU 
law explicitly embedded in the constitution’s text. In the words of the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, amending the Hungarian constitution would be necessary so as to enable him to 
more effectively oppose EU law on migration and in particular the EU-wide refugee 
resettlement quota,39 and protect Hungary’s ‘sovereignty and cultural identity’ against an 
influx of ‘Muslim invaders’.40 Leaving aside the politics of this constitutional amendment, 
the primary legal aim of such a move is to give the Hungarian government a legal fig leaf 
to disobey EU law when convenient using a legal concept recognised by EU law itself.  
Finally, after winning a constitutional majority in the 2018 election (which 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (‘OSCE’) observers deemed 
unfair),41 Orbán was able to amend once again Hungary’s constitution to include the 
                                                 
37 Halmai, note 35 above, p 41.  
38 Ibid, p 25. 
39 Hungary lost the annulment action it brought alongside Slovakia against the Council of the EU’s decision 
of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit 
of Italy and Greece. See Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631. 
40 R Staudenmaier, ‘Hungary’s Orbán Tells Germany: “You Wanted the Migrants, We Didn’t”’ (8 January 
2018) DW, at http://p.dw.com/p/2qV1w?tw.  
41 OSCE, Hungary Parliamentary Elections, 8 April 2018, ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission 
Final Report, 27 June 2018, p 2. 
 
constitutional identity provisions he desired. In this regard, three changes are worth noting: 
(1) the addition of a clause providing that ‘it is a fundamental obligation of the state to 
protect our self-identity rooted in our historical constitution’; (2) a new Article (E) Section 
(2) providing that Hungary may only participate to the EU and comply with its EU 
obligations to the extent that these are ‘consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms 
laid down in the Basic Law, and shall not limit Hungary’s inalienable right of disposal 
related to its territorial integrity, population, form of government and governmental 
organisation’; and (3) the addition of a clause providing that ‘[a]ll bodies of the State shall 
protect the constitutional self-identity of Hungary’.42 
In the absence of any definition of Hungary’s constitutional ‘self-identity’ (or of its 
‘historic constitution’ for that matter), one may be left wondering about the exact contours 
of such identity. To quote the title of a newspaper article, the lack of definition should not 
surprise us as ‘Hungary’s constitutional identity is whatever Viktor Orbán says it is’.43 And 
when it comes to the country’s identity, Orbán’s views are very much reminiscent of an 
approach which was dominant in certain European countries in the 1930s. As he put it in a 
2017 speech: 44 
 
There is no strong culture without a cultural identity … there is no cultural identity 
in a population without a stable ethnic composition. The alteration of a country’s 
ethnic makeup amounts to an alteration of its cultural identity. 
                                                 
42 Unofficial translation of Bill number T/332, Seventh Amendment of the Basic Law of Hungary, Budapest, 
May 2018, provided by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, at https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf. 
43 Novak, note 34 above. 




The country’s autocrats have always sought to rely on EU law itself to undermine both 
Hungary’s and the EU’s foundational values such as the rule of law. As the European 
Parliament already pointed out in July 2013 in the first of a (by now long) series of 
resolutions on the concerning situation in Hungary, ‘the European core values set out in 
Article 2 TEU result from the constitutional traditions common to the Members States and 
cannot therefore be played off against the obligation under Article 4 TEU, but make up the 
basic framework within which Member States can preserve and develop their national 
identity’.45 This means that: 46 
 
a violation of the Union’s common principles and values by a Member State cannot 
be justified by national traditions nor by the expression of a national identity when 
such a violation results in the deterioration of the principles which are at the heart 
of European integration, such as democratic values, the rule of law or the principle 
of mutual recognition, with the consequence that a referral to Article 4(2) TEU is 
applicable only in so far as a Member State respects the values enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU. 
 
But despite the fact that it is clear that appeals to the ‘constitutional identity’ provision of 
the EU Treaties should not be used to justify violations of core EU values, the Hungarian 
government continues to do just that. Indeed, the 2018 constitutional amendment bill 
                                                 
45 European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and 
practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), 2012/2130(INI) 
[2016] OJ C75/09, Rec K.  
46 Ibid, Rec M.  
 
claims that Article 4(2) TEU entitles Hungary not only to override EU law based on aspects 
of its national identity but also to oppose EU law based on its ‘choice of political and social 
values considered as significant from the aspect of the national and political self-identity’.47  
This line of reasoning, using constitutional identity explicitly and constitutional 
pluralism implicitly to justify defiance of EU migration policies, is as cunning as it is 
(deliberately) misguided. However, as we can see here—and as we shall see below in the 
Polish case—autocratic authorities care little about conceptual logic or an honest reading 
of EU law, and they continue to find in the dual concepts of constitutional pluralism and 
identity a very useful veneer to disguise their defiance of EU law.  
 
B. Constitutional pluralism to justify the end of judicial independence and non-
compliance with EU rule of law standards 
 
Poland’s White Paper on the so-called judicial ‘reforms’ 48  put forward a number of 
historical, political, managerial, and legal claims to justify the adoption of more than a 
dozen laws which, within a period of two years, have affected ‘the entire structure of the 
justice system in Poland’.49 As the European Commission explained, these changes have 
enabled the executive or legislative powers to systematically ‘interfere significantly with 
                                                 
47 Article 2, Unofficial translation of Bill number T/332, note 42 above. 
48 The use of quotation marks is required as the changes adopted by the Polish authorities are not ‘reforms’ 
but rather a set of unconstitutional measures whose main effect, if not main goal, ‘has been to hamper the 
constitutionally protected principle of judicial independence’ so as ‘to enable the legislative and executive 
branches to interfere with the administration of justice’. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers on His Mission to Poland, A/HRC/38/38/Add.1, 5 
April 2018, para 72.  
49 The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, Warsaw, 7 
March 2018, at https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/the-government-presents-a-white-paper-on-the-
reforms-of-the-polish-justice-system.html.  
 
the composition, the powers, the administration and the functioning of these authorities 
and bodies’.50 In this section, key aspects of the White Paper will be considered in detail. 
In its White Paper, the Polish government relied on the twin concepts of 
constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity to justify these moves in the following 
terms:51  
 
169. The legal system of the European Union is based on constitutional pluralism 
of the member states … . Each country has specific constitutional solutions that are 
rooted in its history and legal traditions and these differences are protected by the 
treaty law of the [EU] … . 
 
170. Constitutional identity, a core value of each national community, determines 
not only the most fundamental values and resulting tasks for state authorities, but 
also sets the limit for regulatory intervention of the European Union. 
 
While the second paragraph of Article 4 TEU, as previously noted, does provide that the 
EU shall respect its Member States’ national identity, the White Paper conveniently ignores 
its third paragraph, which simultaneously requires from each EU Member State compliance 
with the principle of sincere cooperation, something which the Polish government is clearly 
violating. The reasoning above is in any event particularly disingenuous as the changes to 
the judicial system which the government seeks to justify on the basis of constitutional 
                                                 
50 COM(2017) 835 final, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, para 173. 
51 White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above. 
 
pluralism in question were pushed through with regular legislation implemented in 
obvious violation of Poland’s own constitution. To quote the First President of Poland’s 
Supreme Court: 52 
the recent legislative initiatives are of concern not because of the powers of the 
Polish legislator to structure the judicial system in Poland but because the Polish 
legislator abuses such powers in violation of clear constitutional standards and in 
conflict with their interpretation laid down in the case law of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the Supreme Court and the legal doctrine that has developed since the 
adoption of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.  
It evidently follows that ‘breaking a state’s constitutional rules by the parliamentary 
majority cannot be justified by the principle of constitutional autonomy’.53 Right after the 
first significant reference to constitutional pluralism, the Polish government refers to 
constitutional identity. The Polish government appears to think that constitutional identity 
imposes ‘limits’ solely on the EU’s ‘regulatory intervention’ but no limits whatsoever on 
national authorities. However, in fact, as noted by the response to the White Paper by the 
Polish judges association, ‘the autonomy of constitutional identity presupposes that the 
Member State respects the patere legem quam ipse fecisti principle, especially towards its 
own constitution’. 54 They continue that ‘national authorities are required to comply with 
their constitutional obligations, and they cannot invoke “constitutional pluralism” to shield 
themselves from EU scrutiny as they violate their own constitution’.55 
                                                 
52 First President of the Supreme Court, Opinion on the White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, 
Warsaw, 16 March 2018 (on file with the authors). 
53 Iustitia, Polish Judges Association, Response to the White Paper, Warsaw 2018, VIII.2.A, p 106.  
54 Ibid.  
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The White Paper then turns to external sources of authority—both the German 
Constitutional Court and prominent scholars of constitutional pluralism—to justify its 
approach to constitutional identity and pluralism:56 
 
171. Defence of constitutional identity is a key matter for the German 
Constitutional Tribunal … . 
 
173. This special character of the European legal system—comprised both of 
national systems AND acquis communautaire was best described by a Scottish law 
philosopher, Neil MacCormick. In his commentary to the German Federal 
Constitutional Tribunal in its ruling over the Treaty of Maastricht (case Brunner) 
where one can find roots for the nowadays ample and developed theory of 
constitutional pluralism. 
 
This line of defence, as the example of Hungary shows, is not original. Viktor Orbán is 
known to have responded ‘to criticisms against the laws and constitutional provisions 
adopted by his government by citing similar laws and provisions in democratic states’.57 
The Polish government is following suit with its own strategic cherry-picking of foreign 
courts’ case law. What the White Paper unsurprisingly fails to mention is that the BVerfG 
made clear that ‘the constitution-amending legislature’ cannot violate ‘the identity of the 
                                                 
56 White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above. 
57 O Varol, ‘Stealth Authoritarianism’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 1673, p 1717.  
 
[German’s] free constitutional order’.58 This omission is not surprising as what we have 
seen in Poland is a ‘legislative-amending legislature’ violating repeatedly Poland’s 
Constitution.  
As for the references to Professor MacCormick’s work, the Polish government 
draws from it the need for both the EU and its Member States to show self-restraint and 
mutual respect when it has shown none, before misleadingly implying that it is the EU 
which is disrupting the ‘peculiar construct’ of the European legal system by objecting to 
its ‘own sovereign institutional solutions’ regarding Poland’s judiciary. For example, it 
claims that:59  
 
189. This is exactly why the reforms that cut down the long shadow of communism 
in the Polish justice system are in line with European standards and embrace the 
values on which the European Union is founded. Not consenting to the evil of 20th 
century totalitarianisms is also an insuperable element of the Polish 
constitutional identity.  
 
The Polish governments references to the EU’s values are particularly ironic, here. As for 
the reference to Polish constitutional identity, it is not clear what the drafters meant to say 
by ‘insuperable element’ (the Polish version would suggest a translation error with 
‘insuperable’ used instead of ‘inseparable’) or how one can possibly connect in any rational 
way twentieth century totalitarianisms with changes made to Poland’s judiciary in the 
                                                 
58  Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (English version at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000
208en.html), para 216.  
59 White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above (bold in original). 
 
twenty-first century, thirty years after the fall of communism. What is in any event striking 
is the absence of any attempt to offer any details on of what this Polish constitutional 
identity may consist.  
Finally, the concluding section of the Polish government’s White Paper contains 
two paragraphs that make extraordinary claims: 60 
 
206. The European legal system is founded on the recognition of constitutional 
pluralism enshrined in Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union which also 
guarantees that each member state may shape its own judicial system in a sovereign 
manner, as long as it does not threaten judicial independence. 
 
207. Tensions between the executive and the judiciary lie in the nature of 
democratic systems, yet their very existence does not mean that judicial 
independence is endangered. The Treaty on European Union safeguards 
constitutional identity of the member states as their exclusive national competence, 
which means that reforms of the judiciary should be assessed at the national level 
by competent authorities. 
 
What the second paragraph mildly refers to as ‘tensions between the executive and the 
judiciary’ that fall within the realm of exclusive national competence protected by 
‘constitutional identity’, in fact refers to a situation that is nothing less than an attempted 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
 
constitutional coup d’état.61 To quote the currently under-siege First President of Poland’s 
Supreme Court, ‘the current situation is not one of tensions between different branches of 
power ... rather, this is a genuine revolution in the judicial system which annihilates the 
independence of the judiciary in breach of the provisions of the Constitution’.62 
As for the first paragraph, it misrepresents Article 4 TEU, which does not explicitly 
refer to constitutional pluralism or any right to shape one’s judicial system ‘in a sovereign 
manner’. While the EU may not have any legislative competence regarding the 
organisation of national judiciaries, no ‘reform’ can undermine judicial independence, a 
point which was made crystal-clear by the Court of Justice in a ruling issued ten days before 
the White Paper was published: 63  
 
The Member States are therefore obliged, by reason, inter alia, of the principle of 
sincere cooperation, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, 
in their respective territories, the application of and respect for EU law. In that 
regard, as provided for by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member 
States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for 
individual parties in the fields covered by EU law. It is, therefore, for the Member 
States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective 
judicial review in those fields. 
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What Hungarian and Polish autocrats tend to conveniently forget is that while Article 4 
TEU does impose on the EU an obligation to respect its Member States’ national identities, 
it certainly does not give a blank cheque to national authorities to adopt ‘reforms’ designed 
to violate fundamental EU principles such as the rule of law and judicial independence, 
and to unilaterally decide on their compatibility with the national constitution and EU law.  
With the benefit of hindsight, one can now more easily see how the inclusion of a 
‘national identity’ clause in the European Treaties was a mistake that has been further 
compounded by a number of senior courts in countries such as Germany or France relying 
on the open-ended and abuse-prone concept of constitutional identity.64 The worm has been 
in the fruit ever since. As noted by Vlad Perju, the CJEU has an essential role to play here 
as it ‘can contain and control the effect of national identity by centralizing its meaning’, 
for instance, by ‘defining a range of acceptable meanings of the concept of national 
identity’.65 We would submit in this respect that a good starting point would be for the 
Court to adopt and enforce the balanced position of the European Parliament, whereby a 
referral to Article 4(2) TEU can only be considered legitimate and reasonable ‘only in so 
far as a Member State respects the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU’ and behaves in full 
compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU.66 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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Constitutional pluralists were well-intentioned and their theory was nuanced, but they did 
not anticipate how their theories might be readily abused by legal miscreants. 
Constitutional pluralism is a theory designed for polite society, but we live in brutal 
times. Many legal scholars in recent years rejected the first generation of EU legal 
scholarship saying that too many scholars previously acted more as cheerleaders of the 
CJEU than as sober critics when they applauded and parroted the doctrines—such as 
primacy and direct effect—enunciated by the CJEU rather than engaging in critical legal 
scholarship. These scholars had a point. A number of historians and sociologists have 
done fascinating studies of the tight networks of lawyers, judges, and scholars who 
formed the early ‘European legal field’ and who in many cases worked quite intentionally 
to build the EU legal order.67 So, perhaps a counterbalancing was in order and the 
emergence of scholarship on constitutional pluralism was part of a general trend amongst 
scholars to become more critical of CJEU assertions of unquestioned supremacy. But 
things have gone too far and now, as we describe above, the dangers of constitutional 
pluralism have become clear. In their rejection of Luxembourg’s perceived arrogance, 
many scholars embraced Karlsruhe’s assertions of constitutional identity without 
considering where all this might lead in more dangerous times. In an age when liberal, 
constitutional democracy is facing a clear and present danger, the time has come to 
dismantle constitutional pluralism. 
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